Who did What to Whom
Posted by
Thomas Nycroft on June 27, 2000 at 08:43:22:
Why were the Field brothers arrested? It is clear that Stalin was afraid that Eastern European communist countries would not stay loyal to the Soviet Union. He knew that the Soviet Union was oppressiuve, and so patriotic Poles, Czechs, etc. would want to resist its demands. The revolts that occurred later in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, as soon as controls were lifted slightly, shows that he was right. And so it makes sense that Stalin not only got rid of non-communists (his failure to assist during the Watrsaw Uprising being an early example), but of communists who had spent the war years in the West, as happened in conjunction with the Field case. And Tito was a model of an independent communism that Stalin feared. But that does not mean that Stalin did this purging all by himself in a vacuum. The fact is that there had been peace for a couple of years before the Cold War got going. Each side was healing its ghastly wounds. While Churchill can be said to have begun the Cold War psychologically when he directed his "Iron Curtain" speech at Americans shortly after the war, documents show that the big push for the Cold War began quite late, in 1948, with the predictable fall of Czechoslovakia to communism as the pretext for Marshall, Forrestal, and others to announce the great red peril, and get the Cold War into physical existence. We all know that this was not seen as a tragedy by many Western power brokers, but a good thing. Some say it served what Eisenhower later called the "military-industrial complex." Some might not go so far, and would say that it was necessary for capitalist nations to take an aggressive stand against the now-expanded communism in Europe. I have yet another interpretation, which I will go into later. Regardless, the West was not going to sit by while Stalin ran his new empire. They would respond not only militarily and diplomatically, but subversively. Sherlock Holmes once said to Watson, "And then there was the curious incident of the dog in the night-time." "The dog did nothing in the night-timre," retorted Watson. "That was the curious incident!" replied Holmes. Along that line, we know of little if any effort by the West to destabilize the Soviet Union in the post-war yars (or before). Yes, we spied on them, but that is not the same thing. The West surely attempted to disrupt the Soviet Union. The first rule in being divisive is to use the target's weaknesses. (For example, you don't try to bring Clinton down by accusing him of illegal break-ins, and you don't bring down Nixon with a sex scandal.) Stalin was a dictator and indeed was in continual fear of plots against him. So the best way to upset him was to play on his fear. ("Elementary, my dear Watson!") There would have been something wrong with Western cold warriors if they didn't in fact do this. I assert that this indeed happened. If one looks at the story of Slansky in Czechoslovakia, one sees hesitation and backtracking from Stalin. It was as if someone was pushing him one way, and he was resisting. Note that in both the Rajk trial in Hungary in 1949 and the Slansky trial in 1952, the principals were not peripheral Westernized communists, but loyal hardened government officials of these countries. In trying them, he caused the maximum confusion and destruction. On top of that, most of the defendents in these trials were Jewish, which was destabilizing since the communist parties of both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were generally dominated by Jews at the upper levels. Certainly Stalin knew that fear was a good way to keep people in line, but this behavior was destructive to both Eastern Europe and to him. Stalin has been called paranoid, but I know of no information that shows him to be clinically so. He was generally rational but extremely ruthless as far as I can tell. Would Stalin lie to his associates that the Field brothers were American spies, so that he could get rid of certain communists and put fear into the rest? It doesn't ring true to me on a human level; it would have been so confusing and disruptive to his own authority. It certainly seems more like a panic reaction to fears that kept on popping up. I assert that someone was feeding those fears to Stalin. I suggest that information was planted by the West to make it appear that the Field brothers were actually American spies. Although those were dangerous times, it really was not a likely thing that either would be arrested, except as a way to put the Soviet Union on the defensive. There is no reason the Field brothers should have anticipated it, since mighty few people were thinking of that, either then or since. I think it is better to see the Field case not as an example of paranoid tyranny, but rather as part of the cold war against the Soviet Union. Although "Trapped in the Cold War" is more a gripping, beautifully written account of a prison experience than a political treatise, I think it should still be read with this in mind. This is not the view of the authors. However, it was expressed in the 1974 British book "Operation Splinter Factor", which is in the bibliography. That book argued that Allen Dulles had his acquaintance Noel Field arrested out of pique -- that he felt he had been used by Noel and his communist contacts at the end of World War II, and also to cause turmoil in Eastern Europe that would bring on a revolt. This remarkable book makes quite a convincing case. Perhaps that is what Dulles thought. I think it is correct in making the Field case a Western operation. Maybe that is the main point to consider in all this. However, I think that that book intentionally only told only half of what happened. Rather, it was a way to stick it to the Americans again, while boasting of a successful operation. I go further down this path, into an area few are willing to follow. I assert that by the end of World War II, the US (under FDR) and the USSR were about to make a loose alliance to develop the world. Despite their different systems, both had the same belief in progress and development. That left Britain, a small island that necessarily believed in exploitation and finance as the way to power, and had practised that for centuries, out in the cold. To make things worse, the US and USSR believed in dismantling colonialism, Britain's life blood. And so Britain set to switch things around. It had already made an alliance with New York finance, and it was also influential via the Council on Foreign Relations, which was a copy of Britain's Royal Institute of International Affairs. And so the Cold War was born, with the US and USSR at dagger's ends, and Britain the friendly intermediary. One could say that Britain quietly allied itself with the US against the USSR, and with the unwitting USSR against the US. In the end, the Cold War wrecked both major powers. (If you don't see that it wrecked America's potential, look a little harder.) So how was the Field case contrived? "Operation Splinter Factor" says Jozef Swiatlo, the Polish official who both arrested and sprung Hermann Field, was a British agent and then an American agent. I would suggest that there was more: When British intelligence realized in the late 1940's that Kim Phiby was working for the Soviet Union, they decided to make use of this knowledge rather than waste it by firing him. They put him in charge of intelligence communication between London and Washington. I think that London then sent messages to its partners in Washington declaring the Fields as American spies, and he passed these on to Moscow. Whatever the origin of these events, the East European spy trials have been called by one commentator a key to the downturn and collapse of communism. The Field case is a key to the spy trials, so the case is far more important than is generally realized, even if the Field brothers were victims not agents -- in either sense of the word. It is too bad that this book has yet to receive the attention it deserves, esthetically and politically.
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